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Abstract. The design of the educational system affects the degree of students’ 
equality of opportunities and the intergenerational social mobility. The topic is 
therefore of paramount importance. In this paper, we document differences in 
educational systems among OECD countries and argue that the system observed in 
a country is the result of a complex interaction between preferences for education 
and political competition. To analyse individual preferences over education 
funding, we build a model that allows us to study the effects of public funding on 
the welfare of agents, which are heterogeneous in terms of income and human 
capital. The model takes into account the hierarchical nature of the educational 
system and emphasises the role played by family background. Our theoretical 
results might help to explain why some OECD countries seem to remain stuck in 
“low education” traps.  
Keywords: basic and tertiary education, equality of opportunity, individual 
preferences, parental education, political economy. 
 
Introduction 
Educational systems vary considerably over the world, even among developed countries. Not 
only the share of GDP devoted to education is different but also the composition of education 
expenditures by level of education (primary/secondary vs. tertiary) and by program orientation 
(vocational vs. general).1Other important aspects of differentiation include, among others, 
financing (e.g. public vs private), years of compulsory schooling and school tracking.2 
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1Another relevant aspect is the distribution of graduates by field of education. Di Gioacchino and Profeta (2014) argue 
that differences in the composition of human capital are related to the production structure of the economy through the 
key role of firms’ political pressure activity: firms specialized in different sectors lobby to induce the government to 
subsidize the type of education complementary to their production. 
2Recently, Ozkok (2016)has investigated the impact of globalization on public education financing in Europe at 
different levels of education. 
  
 
In recent decades, educational systems have increasingly been the object of scientific as well as 
political debate. An important aspect of the discussion is the relationship between educational 
systems and the degree of equality in educational opportunities provided to students. The 
question is important since the lower the degree of equality in educational opportunities, the 
stronger pupils’ educational attainments are determined by the family background. This 
dependency is in turn held responsible for lower intergenerational mobility of human capital 
(and hence of income) and persistent social inequality.3 
Public provision of education is usually justified as a (politically acceptable) means of 
redistributing income in order to provide students from low social background the same 
educational opportunities of students from a high social background. However, even when 
education fully relies on public funding, access to the former is not homogeneously distributed 
across social groups. Indeed, the social and cultural environment at home might directly 
influence children’s educational attainments at school and, in turn, employment and earning 
prospects. Thus, parents from higher social background are more prone to encourage their 
offspring investment in education than parents from lower social background do.  
Another potential factor affecting the relationship between schooling outcomes and family 
background is school tracking.4A school system is characterized by tracking when students are 
allocated, at some stage of their career, to different tracks, which usually differ in the curriculum 
offered, typically vocational vs. general. Children with highly educated parents are more likely 
to be educated in academically selective schools than those with less educated parents 
(Dustmann, 2004). Thus, educational systems that are similar in terms of the level of public 
funding might nonetheless differ in the extent to which family background affects educational 
                                                          
3
“Intergenerational social mobility refers to the relationship between the socio-economic status of parents and the status 
their children will attain as adults.” (OECD, 2010). Status is often measured by earnings or income, but also measures 
of education, occupation or social class have been used. The empirical literature has sought to evaluate the 
intergenerational earnings elasticity in the relationship that relates the earnings of children to that of their parents. For 
OECD countries, the estimated value of this elasticity varies between 0.15 in Denmark and 0.5 in the Great Britain 
(OECD, 2010 and Corak, 2013).  
4There is substantial cross-country variation in secondary school design, with some countries tracking students into 
different ability schools very early, and other countries with little or no tracking at all (Ariga and Brunello, 2007). 
  
 
outcomes, according to the specific school design observed (comprehensive schooling as 
opposed to early school tracking). 
 Finally, an additional argument explaining why children from poor households have lower 
enrolment rates at increasingly higher levels of education than children from richer families 
relates to the chances of finding a good job position or, put another way, to the effect of family 
lines, social relations and neighbourhood networks on the premium to education. 
Overall, these arguments suggest that there is more to be considered than the level of public 
education expenditure to evaluate the degree of equality in educational opportunities offered by 
different educational systems. Namely, the redistributive effects of public education expenditure 
must be evaluated taking into account the composition of public expenditures across different 
educational stages, the school design, the distribution of income and human capital across the 
adult population and the influence of parental background in allocating offspring in good jobs 
positions.  
These same factors are also relevant in shaping individual preferences for public education 
policies and, in turn, to understand the variability in education systems across different societies. 
In fact, the policies implemented might be seen as the result of the aggregation of individuals’ 
(policy) preferences through the specific political process in act.   
In this paper, we graft a model to analyse the determinants of individual’s preferences by 
incorporating all the insights developed above. Namely, the model takes into account the 
hierarchical nature of the educational system by separating basic (K-12) from tertiary 
education.5 In the model, the hierarchical nature of the educational system implies that higher 
education is never a good of universal access, even if it is free. The probability of acceding to 
university depends on parents’ human capital and on K-12 school design features, such as 
school tracking. Moreover, we take into account the possibility of talent mismatching, allowing 
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returns from human capital accumulation to depend on family background, with pupils coming 
from rich families earning, ceteris paribus, higher returns than pupils from poor families do.  
Contrarily to intuition, the analysis highlights the fact that less affluent households might be 
willing to form a coalition with the richer segment of the population to reduce the overall level 
of education expenditures. The likelihood of this event is greater in countries where the 
education premium is strongly related to family ties and/or where the share of population with 
tertiary education is low and the specific design of the education system is not of an inclusive 
type. 
The paper’s contribution is twofold: on the one hand, it can contribute to understand the 
documented differences in educational systems over OECD countries, in particular it might help 
to explain why some countries seem to remain stuck in “low education” traps; on the other 
hand, it contributes to the theoretical literature by modelling individual’s preferences for public 
education by taking explicitly into account the hierarchical nature of the educational system. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the related literature. Section 3 presents 
descriptive evidence on the main features characterizing educational systems across OECD 
countries. Section 4 offers a model of individual preferences over education policy as a 
contribution to understanding the observed differences in educational systems. Section 5 
contains some concluding remarks and indicates directions for future research.  
 
2 Related literature 
The so called human capital view, inspired by Becker and Tomes (1979 and 1986), sees the 
intergenerational transmission of inequalities as almost exclusively due to the role played by 
liquidity constraints in the accumulation of human capital.  If capital markets are not perfect and 
public institutions do not compensate for this effect, lack of liquidity always limits investment 
in human capital of individuals coming from disadvantaged backgrounds. The government can 
try to make up for poor background with publicly provided education but children from poor 
  
 
households have overall much lower enrolment rates at increasingly higher levels of education 
than children from richer families.6To this respect, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992 and 2003) 
argue that a sufficient high elasticity of parental human capital in the learning technology might 
be responsible for low intergenerational mobility of human capital, even in educational systems 
where funding is mainly public. Put another way, since education is a hierarchical process, 
students from disadvantaged family backgrounds have a much lower probability of entering 
higher levels of education because with a greater probability they fail to meet the basic 
prerequisites to advance into education.  This view is supported by the observation that lack of 
financial means is not the only barrier in the access to university; even more relevant is the 
failure to attain the educational prerequisites needed to enter university.  Ample evidence from 
the United States suggests that true credit constraints are not a binding issue in the admission to 
higher education in the vast majority of cases (see Carneiro and Heckman, 2002). Rather, the 
fact that students from disadvantaged family backgrounds have a much lower probability of 
entering university seems to be due to the lack of early educational investments, which deprive 
these students of the basic prerequisites to advance to university (see Cunha et al., 2006). This 
phenomenon appears to be even more relevant in Europe, where higher education is mostly 
publicly funded (Woβmann and Schutz, 2006). Cardak and Ryan (2009) for Australia find 
similar results.7 
The literature considering education as a hierarchical process is small. Much of the literature on 
education treats basic (K-12) and tertiary education symmetrically, or simply assumes a single 
type of education. However, some recent works have begun to model explicitly the two types of 
educational expenditures and to investigate the dynamic effects of allocating public funds 
between basic and advanced education.8In the specific, Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) find that 
educational policies aimed at early education are far more effective at reducing persistence of 
                                                          
6See De Fraja (2004) for a discussion of this point. 
7See also Reis (2010) on this point. 
8See Restuccia and Urrutia (2004); Su (2004); Blankenau (2005); Blankenau et al. (2007); Arcalean and Schiopu 
(2010). 
  
 
discrepancies in earnings than policies aimed at college education. Their result hinges on the 
relative strength of poor parents’ borrowing constraints, which appear to be more relevant in 
early stages of offspring’s education. In the same line, Su (2004) obtains that for an economy in 
its early development stage, focusing on basic education for sufficiently long duration is the 
only way out of poverty. 
Another potential factor affecting the relation between schooling outcomes and family 
background is school tracking (Brunello and Checchi, 2007). As reported by Woβmann and 
Schutz (2006), there is some evidence that later tracking is associated with better student 
performance and that moving away from early tracking has positive effects on educational 
attainment, especially for students with a lower socio-economic background.9Overall, these 
studies suggest an equity-enhancing role for late tracking.10 
The relationship between family background and educational attainments might be also affected 
by social classes’ formation. Bowles and Gintis (2002) argue that social classes are not based 
exclusively on people’s talent and ability or educational achievements, but also on family 
connections.11These factors give kids from rich families higher chances of being allocated into 
better paying jobs, and hence of remaining rich, even when they have low talent; at the same 
time they reduce the chances of the poor to improve their status, even when they have more 
talent. Franzini et al. (2013) empirically analyse the association between parents’ social 
background and several offspring’s outcomes (education, labour market achievements, 
earnings) in eight EU countries. Interestingly, they find that, in Nordic and Central European 
countries, the influence of parental background on earnings appears entirely mediated by 
intervening factors such as educational attainments and the process of occupational sorting. 
Differently, in Southern countries, Great Britain, and Ireland, they find a significant association 
                                                          
9Ferreira and Gignoux (2011); Aakvik et al. (2010); Meghir and Palme (2005). 
10Hanushek and Woessmann (2006) make use of PISA and find that inequality in performance is higher in countries 
that adopt early tracking compared to countries that do not. 
11Bowles and Gintis (2002) and Goldthorpe and Jackson (2008) emphasize the impact of familiar models on the 
development of children’s non cognitive traits such as risk aversion, extroversion, the willingness to work in team, the 
sense of discipline or leadership. All these traits seem to be extremely relevant in determining labour market success.  
  
 
between family background and earnings, not mediated by the other factors, confirming the 
“mismatch of talent” hypothesis (Bernasconi and Profeta, 2009). 
Overall, the literature reviewed above helps to identify the factors that may explain the degree 
of equality of opportunities offered by different educational systems to students from different 
background. As already mentioned in the introduction, the prevailing educational system can be 
seen as the outcome of a (political) process that aggregates individuals’ preferences for 
education policy. 
The study of the micro-foundations of education policy in terms of individual policy 
preferences, and their interaction with macro variables is the object of works like Busemeyer 
and Iversen (2014), Busemeyer (2012), Ansell (2008) and Kitschelt and Rhem (2006). 
Busemeyer and Iversen (2014) and Busemeyer (2012), for example, analysing survey data for a 
large number of OECD countries, show that, at the individual level, the impact of income on 
preferences strongly depends on the interaction between the micro level and the macro level 
institutional context. This confirms that redistributive implications of investments in education 
are less clear-cut compared to other public policies. More specifically, they find that - at the 
micro level - the relationship between individual income and support for education spending 
depends on two aspects of the macro-level context: the level of economic inequality, as the 
standard Meltzer Richard’s (1981) argument would suggest, and the inequality in the 
distribution of human capital. In the specific, high levels of educational inequality, mitigate the 
negative impact of income on the support for public education, reflecting the fact that children 
from lower social background have much lower enrolment rates at increasingly higher levels of 
education. 
Ansell (2008) builds a political economy model of public spending on tertiary education based 
on individual preferences. He argues that the lower the enrolment rate of pupils from low-
income families, the higher the probability that poor families form a coalition with rich families 
against middle-income families to reduce public spending in tertiary education. 
  
 
While Busemayer (2012) does not distinguish public educational spending across levels of 
education, Ansell (2008) concentrates on tertiary education spending. To the best of our 
knowledge, the literature has not yet investigated the micro foundations of education policy, in 
terms of individual policy preferences, distinguishing between basic (K-12) and tertiary 
education. In this paper, we aim at filling this gap.  
 
3. Stylized facts 
In this section, we provide evidence on educational systems across OECD countries, focusing 
on expenditures - levels and composition -, source of financing - private vs. public - and school 
tracking.12We also document correlations between these variables and various dimensions of 
inequality. 
Figure 1 shows countries’ differences in terms of spending on education as a share of GDP, 
regardless of the funding system. The OECD average share is 5.2%; three countries (Slovakia, 
Hungary and Italy) spend less than 4%, while top spenders (New Zealand, Denmark, USA, 
Great Britain, Norway, Chile and Canada) allocate more than 6% of their GDP to education.13 
A further dimension of heterogeneity concerns how this flow of resources is distributed among 
educational stages and, in particular, between non-tertiary or basic (K-12) and tertiary. As 
expected, all countries allocate the greater share to basic education: 3.7% of GDP on average, 
compared to 1.5% of GDP to tertiary education. Nevertheless, there is great variability in the 
distribution of resources, with countries such as USA, Chile, Canada and Korea spending more 
than 2% of their GDP on tertiary education, which corresponds to around 40% of resources 
dedicated to education allocated to tertiary education. 
                                                          
12Data are taken from OECD (2015). A summary table, at the bottom, summarizes all the original variables used for the 
following descriptive analyses. 
13Please note that if two countries differ in terms of per-capita GDP and demographic structure, a given share of 
spending corresponds to different levels of spending per student (see summary table at the end of the paper). For this 
reason, we have eliminated Luxemburg, which is too much of an outlier in terms of GDP per capita. 
  
 
With regard to the source of funding, while non-tertiary education is in general almost entirely 
publicly funded, huge disparities exist in the degree of public funding towards tertiary level. For 
example in Slovakia, Island, Poland, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Germany, Slovenia, 
Switzerland, Belgium and Norway more than 90% of tertiary education is publicly funded - 
with the last six countries that rely almost entirely on a public system - while in Chile, Japan 
and Korea the tertiary share is less than 40% and in USA it is 50%. Similarly, public 
expenditure on tertiary education as a share of GDP ranges between less than or equal to 0.8% 
in Japan, Italy, Korea and Hungary, and1.8% in Denmark and Finland (see figure 2). 
By crossing these dimensions of variability, one can visualize how the countries are positioned 
in terms of resources allocation between the two stages of education. The left panel in figure 3 
plots total expenditures in tertiary and non-tertiary education as a share of GDP, while the right 
panel plots public expenditures in tertiary and non-tertiary education as a share of GDP. 
 
Figure 1: Education expenditures as a share of GDP 
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Figure 2: Expenditures on tertiary education as a share of GDP 
 
 
 
Countries such as Finland, Denmark, Great Britain and New Zealand are high spenders on both 
levels. Others spend more than the average on tertiary education (USA, Canada and Korea) or on K-
12 (Belgium, Island, Ireland, Israel, Norway and Portugal). Finally, countries such as Spain, Italy, 
Hungary and Slovakia spend less than average on both levels. Among high spenders, Denmark, 
Norway and Finland show a high share of public spending on both education levels while others, 
USA and Korea, are more oriented towards private expenditures. 
Following the literature (e.g. West and Nicolai, 2013; Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011), we use 
enrolment in vocational education programs as a proxy for educational tracking which, compared to 
tracking age, presents higher variability.14Figure 4 shows the share of students enrolled in 
vocational programs at the upper-secondary school level. This variable ranges from zero in Ireland 
to 71% in Czech Republic withthe OECD average being 41%. 
                                                          
14Tracking age is reported in the summary table at the end of the paper. 
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Figure 3: Tertiary vs Non-tertiary expenditures. Total on GDP (left) and public on GDP 
(right) 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Share of vocational students at the upper-secondary level 
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- which explain 94% of the variance - are easily interpreted as the total share of resources allocated 
AUS
AUT
BEL
CAN
CHE
HL
CZE
DEU
DNK
ESP
EST
FIN
FRA
GBR
HUN
IRL
ISL
ISR
ITA
JPN
KOR
MEX
NLD
NOR
NZL
POL PRT
SVK
SVN
SWE
TUR
USA
OECD-AVG
(mean)
(mean)
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
3
Te
rti
a
ry
2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Non-tertiary
scatter linear fit
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2015
Total expenditure to GDP (%)
AUS
AUT
BEL
CAN
CHE
CHL
CZE DEU
DNK
ESP
EST
FIN
FRA
GBR
HUN
IRL
ISL
ISR
ITA
JPN
KOR
MEX
NLD
NOR
NZLPOL
PRT
SVK
SVN
SWE
TUR
USA
(mean)
(mean).
5
1
1.
5
2
Te
rti
a
ry
2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
Non-tertiary
scatter linear fit
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2015
Public expenditure to GDP (%)
0 20 40 60 80
vocational student (%)
IRL
USA
CAN
NZL
AUS
ISL
KOR
ESP
JPN
DNK
HUN
EST
CHL
GBR
DEU
MEX
PRT
FRA
ISR
OECD average
SWE
NOR
TUR
FIN
POL
NLD
BEL
ITA
SVN
CHE
SVK
AUT
CZE
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance 2015
Share of vocational student in the upper-secondary level, 2013
  
 
to education (PC1), the intensity of vocational orientation coupled with the degree of public funding 
of education (PC2) and the relative weight given to tertiary education, especially publicly financed 
(PC3). 
  
Table 1: Principal components (eigenvectors)  
 
Variable PC1 PC2 PC3 
Non-tertiary/GDP 0.60 0.11 -0.34 
Tertiary/GDP 0.33 -0.50 0.58 
Non-tertiary public/GDP 0.58 0.29 -0.27 
Tertiary public/GDP 0.33 0.42 0.66 
Vocational students (% ) -0.29 0.69 0.18 
 
The subsequent cluster analysis based on these indicators and the resulting hierarchical tree-diagram 
(Figure 5) helps us to identify five groups of countries.15 
 
Figure 5: Cluster analysis dendrogram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15A complete-linkage clustering is adopted. The vertical axis of the dendrogram represents the distance or dissimilarity 
between clusters. The horizontal axis represents the countries and clusters. The purpose is to obtain few groups, each 
containing elements that are similar among themselves and dissimilar to elements belonging to other groups. In 
practice, the choice on the number of groups is the choice of the vertical level at which to cut the tree. 
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Group 1, with 8 countries: Australia, Great Britain, Ireland, Island, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand 
and Portugal. 
Group 2, with 4 countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Norway. 
Group 3, with 4 countries: Canada, USA, Chile and Korea. 
Group 4 with 8 countries: Austria, Switzerland, Estonia, France, Netherland, Poland, Slovenia and 
Sweden. 
Group 5, with 8 countries: Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Slovakia and 
Turkey. 
Group 1 consists of high-spending countries that favour basic education. They spend more than 4% 
of GDP in basic education, with a prevalence of public funding. Their program orientation at the 
secondary level is general. Group 2 consists of high spenders on both education levels. They spend 
around 6% of GDP in education, almost entirely publicly financed. Their program orientation is 
mixed with a middle-high share of students enrolled in vocational programs. 
Group 3 consists of high-spending countries (more than 6% of GDP) that favour tertiary education 
with a high share of private financing. They spend above 2% of GDP on tertiary education, with a 
high share of private funding. They have a marked general orientation at the (upper) secondary 
level. Group 4 consists of middle-spending countries, with education almost entirely publicly 
financed at both levels and a relatively high share of students enrolled in vocational programs. Their 
total spending ranges between 4.7% of Poland to 5.5% of Netherlands. Finally, group 5 consists of 
low-spending countries with a middle-high vocational component. Their total spending ranges 
between 3.7% of Slovakia to 4.4% of Japan. 
The causal relationship between the characteristics of the education system and inequality - in 
education and income - can “go both ways”. On one side, the characteristics of the education system 
directly contribute to determine the level and the distribution of education in the population and, 
indirectly, the level and the distribution of income. At the same time, income and education 
  
 
inequality influence preferences for education and, through the political process, the education 
system. An econometric analysis at the macro level is outside the scope of the present paper and, in 
what follows, we look at simple correlations between education variables and socio-economic 
inequality. More specifically, besides correlations between expenditure on education, on the one 
hand, and income as well as education inequality, on the other, we consider also correlations 
between educational tracking and income/education inequality. 
Figure 6, where the correlation between disposable16 income Gini and the share of tertiary spending 
on total spending in education is considered, shows a clear upward pattern which is consistent with 
the well-known result that more unequal societies tend to spend relatively more on tertiary 
education.17 
 
Figure 6: Income inequality and share of tertiary on total spending in education 
 
 
                                                          
16The choice of disposable rather than a market or pre-tax and transfers definition of income is justified by the fact that 
the focus of this analysis is on the determinants of individual preferences. The former definition is probably better 
suited to explain preferences (and political demand) while the latter is a better proxy of the outcome related to an 
education system. 
17See on this point Di Gioacchino and Sabani (2009) and the literature cited therein. 
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In figures 7 and 8 we consider the association between inequality and education expenditures per 
student.18Figure 7 plots linear/quadratic fits of the Gini index of disposable income against 
education spending per student (USD), separately for basic (left) and tertiary (right) education. 
Figure 8 plots linear fits of the Gini index of disposable income against public education spending 
per student (USD), separately for basic (left) and tertiary (right) education. 
Not surprisingly, being basic education almost entirely publicly financed as well as mandatory, the 
left panels in figure 7 and 8 are very similar and suggest a clear negative correlation between 
income inequality and expenditure per-student in the former educational stage. As for tertiary 
spending per student, while a clear negative correlation emerges for public expenditures, a "U" 
shape picture emerges for the correlation between the income Gini and total spending per student. 
This suggests that for tertiary education, in more unequal societies rich families complement 
(relatively low) public expenditures with private expenditures. 
 
Figure 7: Income inequality and expenditure per student. Non tertiary (left) and tertiary 
(right) 
 
 
 
                                                          
18In countries with high-income inequality probably more individuals are liquidity constrained, therefore we expect a 
low level of demand for tertiary education. So spending as percentage of GDP would be low compared to other 
countries where disposable income is less dispersed. By considering spending per student instead of spending as 
percentage of GDP, we should pick up such “demand” effect. 
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Figure 8: Income inequality and Public expenditure per student. Non tertiary (left) and 
tertiary (right) 
 
 
The causal relationship between income inequality andtrackingis complex and bi-directional. On 
one side, early tracking may cause high social segmentation and thus high (market) income 
inequality; on the other hand, in cohesive societies individuals with vocational education may be 
efficiently placed within the labour market to achieve high levels of production and thus finance 
generous redistribution programs. Thus, if we consider disposable income Gini, the negative 
correlation between disposable income inequality and the share of students enrolled in vocational 
programs shown in figure 9 is not surprising. 
Finally, we consider correlations of education expenditures and tracking with education 
(in)equality. To measure education equality we use the share of population aged 25-64 with tertiary 
education. In fact, since most people in OECD countries have basic education, higher educational 
equality can be expressed by a greater share of tertiary educated population.19 
Figure 10 suggests the existence of striking disparities among OECD countries: the share of 
population aged 25-64 with tertiary education ranges from less than 20% for Mexico, Italy and 
                                                          
19This measure is inversely proportional to the coefficient of variation of a Bernoulli distribution representing the 
probability of having a tertiary education. A continuous measure of educational inequality can be expressed by a second 
moment of years of schooling.  
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Turkey to a value around 50% for Japan, Israel and Canada, the latter being the only country with 
more than 50% of graduates in the population. 
 
Figure 9: Income inequality and share of vocational students 
 
 
Figure 11 plots non-tertiary and tertiary spending per studentagainst our measure of education 
equality. Both plots show a clear upward pattern. This evidence agrees with theoretical expectations 
according to which more educated parents are expected to demand more education for their off-
springs. 
To analyse the relationship between tracking and education equality we consider correlations 
between the share of population with tertiary education and the percentage of upper-secondary 
students enrolled in a vocational program (figure 12, right). On one side, the higher the enrolment in 
vocational programs the lower is the number of students expected to continue to university. On the 
other hand, the literature has emphasised that tracking reduces equality of opportunities in 
education. In line with these arguments, figures 12 show a clear downward pattern. 
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Figure 10: Population with tertiary education 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Population with tertiary education Vs non-tertiary (left) and tertiary (right) 
expenditure per student 
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Figure 12: Educational equality Vs share of vocational students 
 
 
 
4. The model 
In the economy, there is a continuum of families of measure one. A family, indexed by j, 
consists of a parent (old agent) and a child (young agent). Old agents are endowed with an 
exogenous income (�௝), consume and make educational transfers to their children.20Young 
agents get educated in a hierarchical schooling system in which basic (K-12) education might be 
followed by tertiary education. The educational transfer is distributed over the two educational 
stages and old agents allocate the transfers in order to maximize their expected utility derived 
from family consumption and returns from the human capital accumulated by their offspring. 
Old agents are heterogeneous along two dimensions: income and human capital. Income is 
distributed in the old population according to a distribution function ( )⋅F
 
with mean Y. We 
assume that the median income is lower than the mean. Child’s future income depends 
positively on the level of accumulated human capital. Moreover, we assume that the premium to 
education is higher for “connected” families, where family connections are supposed to be 
                                                          
20
 The educational transfer might be thought of as goods or time. In this last case, increased time with children reduces 
income endowment and, as in the case of investment in goods, reduce disposable income for consumption. 
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positively correlated with parent’s income.21Let �௝  and �௝ indicate, respectively, parent’s 
income and family connections (income-related). �௜ indicate parent’s level of human capital, 
with i=H,L. Without loss of generality, we assume �� = 0, �ு = 1; this can be interpreted as a 
dummy variable indicating whether the parent has graduated from university or not. We assume 
that a fraction k of the old agents have got a university degree. 
4.1 Human capital formation 
Human capital formation is modelled as a two-stage process. The first stage is mandatory and 
corresponds to primary and secondary education. The second stage (tertiary education) is 
optional and it is pursued only by a part of the population. Parent’s investment (�௜௝) and 
Government’s expenditures (�ீ) are substitutes in the formation of a child’s basic education.22 
Tertiary education expenditures, both private ( ௜ܶ௝) and public (ܶீ ) augment basic education. 
However, access to higher education is not the same for all children. It depends on parents’ 
human capital: this could be because of inheritability of traits (talent) and/or because of cultural 
attitudes. Here we assume that if a parent is highly educated, then his child has, for sure, access 
to tertiary education; if the parent is less educated, the child’s access probability is less than one. 
Formally, let �௜ = ����(ܷ���������/�௜), then �ு = 1 and �� = � < 1. The value of p 
depends on the educational system design, with early tracking being associated with lower p 
level. The parameter p can thus be interpreted as an indicator of the fairness of the education 
system: the higher is p the less access to tertiary education is correlated to parents’ education 
and the higher is the equality of opportunity in education.  
                                                          
21Note however, that the degree to which connections determine the education premium depends on the structure of the 
labour market and it is, at least partially, country specific. 
22Parents’ investment in education could be substitutes or complements with public expenditures. Glomm and 
Ravikumar (1992) and Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) assume that public and private investment are complements, 
whereas Becker and Tomes (1986) that they are substitute. See Nordblom (2003) and Arcalean and Schiopu (2010) for 
a discussion and further references 
  
 
Assuming the same elasticity (�) of basic and tertiary education in the production function, we 
write the human capital of a child whose parent’s education and income are, respectively, �௜ and �௝, with i=H, L, as23 
ℎ௜௝ = �(�௜௝ + �ீ)�� ௜ܶ௝ + ܶீ ��      �� �������� ��������� �� ���������
(�௜௝ + �ீ)�           �� ���� ����� ��������� �� ���������  
His future income, which depends also on family’s connections, is given by �௜௝ = ℎ௜௝�ೕ 
4.2 Public and Private educational expenditures 
Public education, which is equally provided to all children, is financed by a proportional income 
tax (�). Let� = � + (1 − �)�be access to tertiary education in the whole population. The 
government budget constraint can be written as: �ீ + �ܶீ = �� 
Where � is average income in the old population. 
As customary in this literature, the family utility function is assumed to be logarithmic in 
parent’s consumption and child’s future income, with relative weight � which measures parent’s 
altruism: 
௜ܷ௝ = ���௜௝ + ����௜௝ 
The utility function is maximised under the family’s budget constraint and the non-negativity 
constraints: �௜௝ + �௜௝ + ௜ܶ௝ = (1 − �)�௝ �௜௝, ௜ܶ௝ , �௜௝ ൒ 0 
                                                          
23
 We are using uppercase letters for the parent and lowercase for the child. 
  
 
It can be shown that the family’s optimal choices of investment in basic and tertiary education 
are, respectively (see appendix)  �௜௝∗ = �௜௝�(1 − �)�௝ + ܶீ � − �1 − �௜௝��ீ �� ��������, ���� ��ℎ������ 
௜ܶ௝∗ = �௜௝�௜�(1 − �)�௝ + �ீ� − �1 − �௜௝�௜�ܶீ  �� ��������, ���� ��ℎ������ 
where �௜௝ = ���ೕ1+���ೕ(1+�௜). 
Families choose private expenditures to balance marginal benefit from basic and tertiary 
education, thus they spend relatively more on the level of education in which the Government 
spends less. As expected, the above solution shows that richer and more connected families 
spend more on both education levels. Moreover, highly educated parents, knowing that their 
children will attend university with probability one, spend more on tertiary education and less 
on basic education than low educated parents. 
4.3 Preferences for education 
In our model, the education system is characterized by the level and composition of public 
education expenses (�,�ீ , ܶீ ) and by the parameter p, which we consider as exogenously 
given. 
 To derive preferences for public education expenditures, we write the family’s indirect utility 
as a function of Government’s choice variables: �௜௝(�,�ீ , ܶீ ) = ���௜௝ + ���௝����௜௝∗ + �ீ� + ���௝���� ௜ܶ௝∗ + ܶீ � 
Given its budget constraints, the Government can choose only two variables. Thus, we only 
consider welfare effects from �ீ and ܶீ , which, after simple computation can be shown to be, 
respectively: ��௜௝��ீ = �1 − �௝�� �1 + ���௝(1 + �௜)� 
  
 ��௜௝�ܶீ = �1 − ��௝� � �1 + ���௝(1 + �௜)� 
Net benefits from basic education are positive (negative) for families whose income is above 
(below) the average, suggesting that public spending in basic education is a way of 
redistributing income. 
Net benefits from tertiary education are positive (negative) if income is lower (higher) than the 
threshold level ��, which depends positively on old average income and negatively on population 
access to university.24 
Thus, with regard to preferences for education, we have three groups of families: poor (�௝ < �), 
middle (income) (� < �௝ < ��) and rich (�௝ > ��).25 
In the appendix, we derive the (corner) solutions shown in the table below:26 
Fig.   Preferences for education expenditures 
 
�௜௝ ௜ܶ௝ �ீ ܶீ  � 
Poor (�௝ < �) 0 0 �௜௝� �௜௝�௜ �� �௜௝(1 + �௜) < 1 
Middle (� < �௝ < ��) �௜௝�௝ 0 0 �௜௝�௜ �� �௜௝�௜ 
Rich (�௝ > ��) �௜௝�௝ �௜௝�௜�௝ 0 0 0 
 
As can be noticed from the table, rich agents prefer the minimum level of public expenditures in 
both basic and tertiary education independently of �௜. Clearly, their position in the income ladder 
fully drives their preferences 
                                                          
24Being connected and/or highly educated does not change preferences, but it increases net benefits (or losses) from 
each education level. 
25Note that as access to university increases, preferences of middle-income families converge to those of rich families. 
The reason is that as the number of students who benefit from public funding of universities increases, middle income 
families pay more than average for tertiary funding but receive the average benefit from it. 
26Note that �௜௝�௜ = 1 − 1+���ೕ1+���ೕ(1+�೔)is increasing in �௜ . 
  
 
Middle-income agents always prefer the minimum level of public expenditures in basic education; 
their preferred level of public expenditures in tertiary education, which increases with �௜, is always 
higher than that of poor families with the same human capital. 
Poor families’ preferred allocation of public funds over the two stages of education depends on �௜ 
(and a). As �௜ increases, the preferred level of public expenditures in basic education decreases, 
while that in tertiary education rises more than proportionally. Thus, among the poor those with 
high human capital prefer an overall higher level of expenditures in education, with a lower level in 
basic and a higher level in tertiary than poor with low human capital. In the extreme case, if ��=0, 
the preferences for tertiary education of poor with low human capital would coincide with those of 
rich families. 
Finally, it is important to note that preferences for public expenditures in education depend also on 
the human capital formation technology parameter (�) and on the premium to education (�௝). These 
parameters are, at least partially, country-specific being related to the productive and social 
structure of the country itself.  
For simplicity, let �௝ = 1,  for �௝ < �, �௝ = � > 1  for � < �௝ < ��  and �௝ ൒ � for �௝ > ��. We can 
now summarise the ranking of preferences (from lowest to highest) for basic and tertiary education 
respectively, as follows:27 
Basic: �ு� = ��� = �ு� = ��� < �ு� < ��� 
Tertiary: if � ∗ � > 1, ுܶ� = �ܶ� < �ܶ� < ுܶ� < �ܶ� < ுܶ� 
To see how conflicting preferences are composed in a political equilibrium, one would need to 
specify the political process and find the pivotal voter or the winning coalition. The outcome of the 
political process would depend on the intensity of the conflict on each dimension of heterogeneity 
(income and human capital), which in turn depends on inequality in that dimension. In a situation 
                                                          
27We denote by LP the poor with low human capital; by HP the poor with high human capital; by LM the middle-
income with low human capital; by HM the middle-income with high human capital; by HR the rich with high human 
capital and by LR the rich with low human capital. 
  
 
with a low level of social conflict, i.e. low income inequality and high access to university,28we 
expect the political equilibrium to be characterized by high public expenditures in education, 
balanced over the two stages. On the other hand, if income inequality is high and access to 
university is limited, the outcome would depend on the identity of the pivotal voter or winning 
coalition. If the pivotal voter were poor, we would anticipate an overall high level of public 
education expenditures unbalanced towards basic education; if the pivotal voter were middle-
income the outcome would probably be an overall high levelofpublic education expenditures 
unbalanced towards tertiary education. If the pivotal voter were rich, a low level of public 
expenditures on both education levels is expected. 
Turning to coalitions, the political equilibrium should be somewhere in between the preferences of 
the groups in the coalition. So, for example, an overall low level of public education expenditure 
unbalanced towards basic education, could be justified by a political coalition between the poor and 
the rich, while an overall low level of public education expenditure unbalanced towards tertiary 
education would be justified by a political coalition between middle income and rich families.  
A detailed analysis of the electoral competition and the political equilibrium is outside the scope of 
the present paper; nevertheless, our insights might help reading the stylised facts described in 
section 3. In comparing the results of the cluster analysis developed in the previous section with the 
analysis of preferences derived from our model, one has to bear in mind that other, country-specific, 
variables influence preferences as well as the identity of the pivotal voter.29 With this caveat, we 
now turn to this comparison. 
Countries in group 1, 2 and 3 feature a high share of individuals with tertiary education. We 
therefore expect the pivotal voter to be highly educated. In group 1 (e.g. Great Britain) income 
inequality is highand program orientation is general. Countries in this group are high spenders, 
especially in basic education. This could be the outcome of a coalition between HP and HR. 
                                                          
28i.e. p close to 1 for all agents so that a is approximately 1. 
29As for example, the demographic structure of the country. 
  
 
Similarly, in group 3 (e.g. USA) income inequality is high and program orientation is general. 
Countries in this group are high spenders, especially in tertiary education. This could be the 
outcome of a coalition between HP and HM. Differently, in group 2 income inequality is low. In 
these countries, high spending on both levels of education is associated with a high share of 
students enrolled in vocational programs. We can interpret this result as the outcome of a political 
process in which the pivotal voter is HM or, as in the previous group, the winning coalition is HP 
and HM. 
In countries with a low share of population with tertiary education, we expect the pivotal voter to be 
low educated and therefore demand for tertiary education to be low. Moreover, if the pivotal voter 
is rich then also expenditures in basic education are low. This is consistent with the characteristics 
of group 5: expenditures are low and program orientation is vocational. 
Finally, group 4 in the cluster analysis, is composed of countries with medium/low income 
inequality, a high share of students enrolled in vocational programs and a relatively high share of 
population with tertiary education. Compared to group 2 it has greater income inequality. Compared 
to group 5 it has lower income inequality and a higher share of population with tertiary education. 
Consistently, countries in this group display a level and a composition of education expenditures 
that is similar but lower than that of countries in group 2. We can interpret this result as the outcome 
of a political process in which the pivotal voter is HM or the winning coalition is HP and HM as in 
group 2. The greater distributive conflict, relative to group 2, between middle income and poor 
families leads to an overall lower level of education expenditures. 
 
5. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
This paper documents differences in education systems across OECD and considers their 
implications for equality of opportunities in education. We stress that ultimately the education 
system observed in a country is the result of a complex interaction between preferences for 
  
 
education and political competition, both of which depend on the characteristics of the underlying 
conflict of interest. To analyse this issue, we put forward a model of individual preferences and 
interpret our theoretical predictions in terms of stylized facts observed on country level data 
withparticular reference toa cluster analysis carried out on educational systems features.  
The empirical analysis suggests that income inequality, program orientation and share of population 
with tertiary education are all related to the level and composition of education expenditure. A 
general result is that total education expenditures are high where tertiary education is widespread, 
suggesting a strong demand effect. Moreover, in countries with high-income inequality, education 
expenditures are positively associated with general program orientation. On the contrary, vocational 
programs combined with high level of education expenditures seem to receive political support in 
countries with highly redistributive welfare states. Overall, the results of our model are consistent 
with the clustering evidence in terms of possible results of preference aggregation through the 
political process. 
The main policy message of our analysis is that focusing on public expenditures to favour equality 
of opportunities in education is not enough. In fact, how these expenditures are allocated to 
different education stages and also the specific design of the education system are crucial 
dimensions in shaping the outcome. Both these aspects determine how resources are distributed 
across the population and thus the degree of equality of opportunities achieved. Furthermore, from a 
political economy perspective, our theoretical analysis of preferences highlights the fact that 
although less affluent households are the segment of population that should strive more to increase 
equality of opportunities, they could accept a coalition with the richer segment of population to 
reduce the overall level of education expenditures. The likelihood of this event is greater in 
countries where the education premium is strongly related to family ties and/or where the share of 
population with tertiary education is low and the specific design of the education system is not of an 
inclusive type. Since these choices are self-reinforcing, they can lock countries into “low education” 
traps. Indeed, the cluster analysis seems to confirm that the amount of resources devoted to both 
  
 
levels of education is low in poorly educated societies, which is precisely where more investment in 
education is needed. 
We leave to future research an empirical analysis on the micro and macro level determinants of 
education policy preferences to test our model predictions. 
 
  
  
 
Appendix 1 
 � ௜ܷ௝ = ���௜௝ + � �����(�௜௝ + �)�� ௜ܶ௝ + ܶீ ����ೕ + (1 − �)���(�௜௝ + �ீ)���ೕ�= 
= ���௜௝ + ���௝����௜௝ + �ீ� + ���௝���� ௜ܶ௝ + ܶீ � 
The utility function is maximised under the family’s budget constraint and the non-negativity 
constraints: �௜௝ + �௜௝ + ௜ܶ௝ = (1 − �)�௝ �௜௝, ௜ܶ௝ , �௜௝ ൒ 0 
FOC ��௎೔ೕ��೔ೕ = −1�೔ೕ + ���ೕ�೔ೕ+�� ൑ 0,  (A1) �௜௝ ൒ 0, �� ௜ܷ௝��௜௝ �௜௝ = 0 ��௎೔ೕ�்೔ೕ = −1�೔ೕ + ���ೕ�்೔ೕ+்� ൑ 0,  (A2) 
௜ܶ௝ ൒ 0, �� ௜ܷ௝� ௜ܶ௝ � ௜ܶ௝ = 0 
If ��� > 0 condition (A1) holds with equality: the marginal utility loss from reduced consumption is 
equal to the marginal utility gain from increased child’s income. If condition (A1) holds as 
inequality, we have a corner solution in which �௜௝ = 0. Parent would reduce �௜௝ because �ீ 
provides enough education for the child. 
Analogously, if ௜ܶ௝ > 0 condition (A2) holds with equality: the marginal utility loss from reduced 
consumption is equal to the marginal utility gain from increased child’s income. If condition (A2) 
holds as inequality, then we have a corner solution in which ௜ܶ௝ = 0. Parent would reduce 
௜ܶ௝because ܶீ provides enough education for the child. 
In case of an interior solution (�௜௝ > 0, ௜ܶ௝ > 0), it can easily be shown that �௜௝∗ = �௜௝�(1 − �)�௝ + ܶீ � − �1 − �௜௝��ீ  
  
 ௜ܶ௝∗ = �௜௝� �(1 − �)�௝ + �ீ� − �1 − �௜௝��ܶீ  �௜௝∗ = �1 − �௜௝(1 + �)��(1 − �)�௝ + �ீ + ܶீ �. 
 
Appendix 2 
 
To derive preferences for public education, write the indirect utility as a function of Government’s 
choice variables  �௜௝(�,�ீ , ܶீ ) = ���௜௝∗ + ���௝����௜௝∗ + �ீ� + ���௝���� ௜ܶ௝∗ + ܶீ � 
Given its budget constraint, the Government can choose only two variables. Substituting for � =��+�்��  in the optimal solution, gives  �௜௝∗ + �ீ = �௜௝ ��௝ + �1 − �௝���ீ + �1 − ��௝� � ܶீ � 
௜ܶ௝∗ + ܶீ = �௜௝� ��௝ + �1 − �௝���ீ + �1 − ��௝� � ܶீ � �௜௝∗ = �1 − �௜௝(1 + �)� ��௝ + �1 − �௝���ீ + �1 − ��௝� � ܶீ � 
Therefore, �௜௝(�ீ , ܶீ ) = ���1 − �௜௝(1 − �)� ��௝ + �1 − �௝���ீ + �1 − ��௝� � ܶீ �
+ ���௝�� ��௜௝ ��௝ + �1 − �௝���ீ + �1 − ��௝� � ܶீ �� + 
+���௝��� ��௜௝� ��௝ + �1 − �௝���ீ + �1 − ��௝� � ܶீ �� 
Simple computations show that ��௜௝��ீ = �1 − �௝�� �1 + ���௝(1 + �)� ��௜௝�ܶீ = �1 − ��௝� � �1 + ���௝(1 + �)� 
  
 
Thus, we have three groups of families: poor (�௝ < �), middle-income (� < �௝ < ��) and rich (�௝ >��).  
Poor prefer the maximum level of public expenditures in both basic and tertiary education. To 
compute these preferred values, note that increasing �ீ and ܶீ  would imply a corner solution for 
private expenditures, that is: �௜௝∗ = ௜ܶ௝∗ = 0. In this case, �௜௝∗ = (1 − �)�௝ = �1 − � = ��+�்�� ��௝  and �௜௝(�ீ , ܶீ ) = ���௜௝∗ + ���௝���ீ + ���௝���ܶீ  
FOC ��௜௝��ீ = −1�௜௝ �௝� + ���௝�ீ  ��௜௝�ܶீ = −1�௜௝ ��௝� + ���௝�ܶீ  
Solving, gives �ீ = �்�� = �௜௝� 
Middle-income families prefer �ீ = 0 and the maximum level of public expenditures in tertiary 
education. That is, they prefer to privately provide basic education to their children and have the 
Government pay for tertiary education. To compute their preferred level of public expenditure in 
tertiary education, notice that increasing ܶீ  would imply a corner solution for private expenditures 
in tertiary education: ௜ܶ௝∗ = 0.  
In this case, �௜௝∗ = (1 − �)�௝ − �௜௝∗  and �௜௝∗ = �௜௝�(1 − �)�௝ + ܶீ � �௜௝(0, ܶீ ) = ���௜௝∗ + ���௝���௜௝∗ + ���௝���ܶீ  
Solving the FOC, gives �ܶீ� = �௜௝� 
Lastly, rich prefer �ீ = 0 and ܶீ =0, because they prefer to privately provide basic and tertiary 
education to their children. This implies �=0 and an interior solution for the family’s utility 
maximization so that 
  
 �௜௝∗ = �௜௝�௝ 
௜ܶ௝∗ = �௜௝� �௝ �௜௝∗ = �1 − �௜௝(1 + �)��௝ 
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ng/ 
GDP 
(3) non-
tertiary/ 
students 
(4) 
tertiaryspending 
/students 
(5) public spending 
on tertiary/ 
educ. spending 
(6) non-tertiary 
public spending/ 
students 
(7) tertiary 
publicspending / 
students 
(8) 25-64 
tertiary pop. 
(9) % vocational 
student - 
uppersecondary 
(10) gini 
disposableinco
me 
(11) age 
oftracking 
AUS 4 1.6 8790 16859 44.9 2467 4730.9 41.9 18.0 0.33 16 
AUT 3.1 1.7 - - 95.3 - - 29.9 71.0 0.28 10 
BEL 4.3 1.4 11007 15503 89.9 7068 9955.0 36.9 57.0 0.27 12 
CAN 3.6 2.5 10226 22006 54.9 2246 4832.5 53.6 4.3 0.32 16 
CHE 3.5 1.2 - - - - - 40.2 63.0 - 12 
CHL 3.6 2.5 - - 34.6 - - 33.0 - 16 
CZE 2.8 1.4 6419 10319 79.3 3636 5845.0 21.5 71.0 0.26 11 
DEU 3.1 1.2 9843 17157 85.9 7046 12281.6 27.1 35.0 0.29 10 
DNK 4.7 1.9 10780 - - - - 35.8 25.0 0.25 16 
ESP 3.1 1.2 - - 73.1 - - 34.7 21.0 0.34 16 
EST 3.2 1.6 - - 78.2 - - 37.5 32.0 0.34 15 
FIN 3.9 1.8 9353 17863 96.2 4998 9547.0 41.8 49.0 0.26 16 
FRA 3.8 1.4 9338 15281 79.8 5322 8710.3 40.0 0.31 16 
GBR 4.5 1.8 10056 24338 56.9 3179 7693.6 42.2 34.0 0.35 16 
HUN 2.6 1.2 4371 8876 54.4 1982 4023.8 23.4 26.0 0.29 11 
IRL 4.4 1.3 - - 81.8 - - 41.0 0.0 0.30 15 
ISL 4.7 1.2 9333 9377 90.6 7046 7079.6 37.1 18.0 0.26 16 
ISR 4.4 1.6 6325 12338 52.4 2072 4040.5 48.5 41.0 0.37 15 
ITA 3 0.9 - - 66 - - 16.9 59.0 0.33 14 
JPN 2.9 1.5 9408 16872 34.3 2151 3858.0 48.2 23.0 15 
KOR 3.7 2.3 7934 9866 29.3 1011 1256.9 44.6 18.0 0.31 14 
MEX 3.9 1.3 2801 8115 69.7 1502 4351.1 18.6 39.0 0.46 15 
NLD 3.8 1.7 10464 19276 70.5 4339 7993.9 34.4 55.0 0.28 12 
NOR 4.6 1.6 13611 20016 96.1 8175 12022.4 41.8 47.0 0.25 16 
NZL 5 1.9 - - 52.4 - - 35.6 13.0 0.33 16 
POL 3.4 1.3 - - 77.6 - - 27.0 53.0 0.30 16 
PRT 4.5 1.3 - - 54.3 - - 21.7 39.0 0.34 15 
  
 
SVK 2.7 1 5231 9022 73.8 3861 6658.5 20.4 68.0 0.25 11 
SVN 3.7 1.2 8457 11002 86.1 6068 7893.8 28.6 61.0 0.25 14 
SWE 3.7 1.7 10652 22534 89.3 5595 11837.2 38.7 46.0 0.27 16 
TUR 3 1.4 2784 7779 80.4 1599 4467.1 16.7 47.0 0.40 11 
USA 3.6 2.8 11732 26562 37.8 1584 3585.9 44.2 0.0 0.39 16 
Source: OECD.Stat. 
Notes:  Denmark figures for tertiary spending/GDP are missing in 2012 and have been imputed from 2009-2011 values.  The information on the share of technical and vocational 
enrolment is missing for USA and has been assumed to be virtually zero. The information at the upper-secondary level is missing for Canada and has been assumed to be equal to 
value reported for the secondary level as a whole. The reference year is 2012 except for (8) - 2013 - and for (11) that is 2009.
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